Disaster in the Desert Read online

  Disaster in the Desert

  Disaster in the Desert

  An Alternate History of El Alamein and Rommel’s North Africa Campaign

  Ken Delve

  Foreword by

  Major (Retd) Mike Noel-Smith

  First published in Great Britain in 2019 by

  c/o Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England For more information on our books, please visit www.greenhillbooks.com, email [email protected] or write to us at the above address.

  Copyright © Ken Delve, 2019

  Major (Retd) Mike Noel-Smith (Foreword) © Greenhill Books, 2019

  Front cover image colourised by John Wilkinson

  ISBN: 978-1-78438-386-2

  eISBN: 978-1-78438-387-9

  Mobi ISBN: 978-1-78438-388-6

  The right of Ken Delve to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with Section 77 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

  A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

  All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing.

  Contents

  Maps

  List of Plates

  Foreword by Major (Retd) Mike Noel-Smith

  Introduction

  Acknowledgements

  1. CRUSADER to Gazala

  2. Gazala to El Alamein

  3. Malta: Cornerstone of Allied Mediterranean Strategy

  4. Alam Halfa: August–September 1942

  5. Operation TORCH and Tunisia: October 1942–February 1943

  6. The Conquest of Egypt – Rommel Victorious

  7. Aftermath

  8. The Reality: The Actual Progress and Outcome of the Campaign

  Maps

  Eastern Mediterranean Theatre

  Malta

  North Africa Theatre

  Tunisia

  El Alamein

  Suez Canal Crossing

  List of Plates

  Pilots of 2 Squadron SAAF.

  Beauforts of 39 Squadron at Gianaclis.

  Allied aircraft destroyed on the ground at Sidi Barrani. The Ju87 Stuka.

  The long distances over which the desert war was fought. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham.

  British 25-pdr artillery.

  Allied bombers attacking dispersed enemy Motor Transport. German armour.

  Allied pilots.

  The Luftwaffe’s Ju87 and Bf109. Malta, showing the wartime airfields.

  The key Allied naval and air base of Gibraltar. Hurricanes of 261 Squadron.

  Delivery of Allied aircraft to Malta by carrier. Ta Kali airfield, Malta.

  Malta landscape.

  Operation Torch.

  General Patton, commander of US II Corps. German Tiger tank.

  Bostons over Tunisia.

  Allied forces land at Bône harbour. British 6-pdr anti-tank gun.

  Observation post in the mountains of Tunisia. Hurricanes of 253 Squadron.

  General Alexander.

  Montgomery consults with Horrocks and other commanders. British infantry dug-in with a Bren gun.

  British tank commander.

  German assault on the defences of Tobruk.

  Foreword

  The battle for North Africa and its strategic control during World War Two has been well documented over the past seven decades. Campaigns over the deserts of Libya and Egypt between Allied and Axis forces were essentially a struggle for control of the Suez Canal and access to oil from the Middle East and raw materials from Asia. Generals such as Rommel, Montgomery, Patton and Arnim became household names as historians picked over the minute detail on decisions made and the greater impact that those decisions would eventually have on the outcome, not only in North Africa but that of World War Two itself.

  However, what might have happened if certain key decisions and troop/ equipment deployments had been different on the day? What if, instead of Operation Torch and the invasion of North Africa resulting ultimately in a joint Anglo-American victory, had the outcome gone the way of victory to the Axis forces? Or, what if the strategic island of Malta, ‘the unsinkable aircraft carrier’, had indeed not withstood the devastating attention of combined Italian and German naval and air forces and capitulated instead?

  In this book, the author covers a very plausible and clever alternative, whereby in North Africa, Rommel’s land forces are victorious leading to a completely different scenario of the outcome of the campaign. Small, but entirely realistic turns of fortune due to a misplaced field gun, a tanker intercepted in the night or poor timing in the arrival of combat ready aircraft lead us through the battlefields to a different picture – one that might so easily have actually happened . . . an Axis victory!

  Major (Retd) Mike Noel-Smith

  Introduction

  The North African campaign/Desert War was one of the most important of World War Two in terms of the development of land and air tactics, and lessons for major operations in other theatres of war, including D-Day. It also brought to public notice great commanders such as Rommel and Montgomery, as well as being the first theatre in which Anglo-American forces worked together – with mixed success. For the Axis forces it was a route to the all-important Middle East oil fields in Iraq and elsewhere, a key strategic objective for the Axis, as well as the political driver of destroying British influence in the area, and for Mussolini of growing his Italian Empire.

  However, it was not a theatre in which the Germans were initially interested; they were dragged into the Mediterranean/Middle East by their Italian allies and only because of the abject failure of those Allies in 1940–1941. Once engaged, there was no way out, and the theatre became something of a logistics and combat unit challenge for the Germans, especially with the competing needs of other theatres, particularly Russia. As with all military operations, success or failure was frequently influenced by seemingly small changes – a decision, one combat action, luck – and the subsequent course of a battle or campaign, and ultimately the war, could have been different. This is the rationale behind ‘alternative histories’ such as this one; based on actual scenarios but with changes that then lead to new scenarios and outcomes. In this book we start with the actual history from early 1942 with the Allies in retreat, having in 1941 been close to winning the Desert War; from summer 1942 we start to change certain events – for example a tanker being sunk on its way to Malta rather than making it to port, a carrier being sunk earlier than it actually was, and thus fewer Spitfires making it to Malta. What if Malta had been invaded? What if Rommel did not suffer supply shortages? These events lead to other changes that in turn influence the overall conduct and progress of the Middle East campaigns, which, in our version, ends with Axis victory.

  Some dates have been changed to aid the progress of events, and some quotes from actual accounts and reports have been used as illustrative of a mission, the quote being correct but when it occurred having been changed. Most of the units and commanders are as they were for real, but some changes have been made, based on the scenarios relevant to the new situation postulated by our account.

  The final chapter then looks at the reality, a short review of the actual outcomes.

  Ken Delve

  Acknowledgements

  This book stemmed from my work on the air side of the Desert and Mediterranean campaigns and it was during a conversation with Michael Leventhal and my comments of how easily the Axis could have won that he suggested I write this alternative history account. My thanks to Michael for the suggestion! Ove
r my years of research, I have collected documents and stories from a wide range of organizations and individuals, and much of that material has helped inform this account, and my views and opinions on what “might have been”. As always, my recognition and gratitude go to the Air Historical Branch, whose extensive archives and excellent cooperation always proved invaluable. As a source of primary documents and research papers, the Defence Technical Information Center is both easy to access and a mine of information. On an individual basis I much appreciate the time and military expertise of Mike Noel-Smith and Andrew Weavill, and Ben Delve in proof-reading and sense-checking the text, and to Mike for writing the Foreword.

  Chapter One

  CRUSADER to Gazala

  After 18 months of war in North Africa, the Allies appeared to be on the verge of victory in 1941, having built-up and modernized forces, and developed new air-ground tactics. General Cunningham, commander of 8th Army, had framed his Operation CRUSADER with aims to destroy the enemy formations in Eastern Cyrenaica and relieve Tobruk, which had a garrison of a division plus two brigades. The assault was to be made by XIII Corps and XXX Corps, plus a sweep south by 29 Indian Brigade. The task for XIII Corps was to skirt the Halfaya Pass and then push via Sollum and Bardia to bring the Axis forces to battle, whilst XXX Corps skirted the Trigh el Abd and drove directly for Tobruk, spearheaded by 7th Armoured Division. The units moved into position from 12th November, shielded by poor weather that limited German air reconnaissance, and with strict signals procedures to minimize risk of the enemy picking up unit movements. Rommel was, however, aware that an offensive was coming, as it was clear the Allies had built-up strength and were under pressure to relieve Tobruk. He was convinced that his best chance for disrupting such an attack was a pre-emptive offensive, but there was the difficulty of finishing off Tobruk, and of convincing his notional Italian commander, Bastico, that the plan was workable. Rommel’s intent was to begin his offensive around the 21st.

  The Allied ground forces rolled forward on the morning of the 18th, heavily supported by air power: “Our fighters had no engagements in the air, but they shot up 18 EA on aerodromes in the back areas. Our bombers attacked enemy MT [Motor Transport] and advanced aerodromes, in particular Baheira, where later XIII Corps found damaged Henschels and Me.110s.” The advance rolled on the following day, with increasing amounts of enemy armour being encountered, and the Luftwaffe making an appearance. “No.1 SA Brigade was heavily attacked by Stukas”. The aircraft of 451 Squadron were flying TacR and one “gave timely warning of enemy tanks east of Sidi Omar to 4th Indian Division.” (Report on Operation Crusader, Wg Cdr A. Geddes.)

  The armoured spearhead had three prongs, 4 Brigade from Gabr Saleh, 7 Brigade in the centre to drive on Sidi Rezegh, and 22 Brigade from Bir El Gobi. Initial success meant that most of the day’s objectives were reached, and 22 Brigade engaged and caused losses to the Italian Ariete Division’s armour. Meanwhile, 15th and 21st Panzer were moving into positions from which to strike back; on the afternoon of the 19th, Battle Group Stephan from 21st Panzer struck the flanks of 4 Tank Brigade, and its tanks and 88mm gun line drove the British back over the Trigh el Abd. The British came on again but in the evening fighting lost 42 Stuarts, against a German loss of three tanks, and with the Germans in control of the battlefield they were able to recover vehicles. For XIII Corps the day had been one of minor engagements.

  Both sides continued to manoeuvre on the 20th, with German armour moving towards the Deheua ridge, being engaged by artillery, whilst 4th Armoured Division was engaging 100-plus tanks near Gabr Taieb El Essem, a duel that meant they were out of ammunition by the end of the day and had to pull back. They were re-supplied that night by a Bombay aircraft. The division had also been the intended target of a Stuka attack, but the enemy, escorted by Me.109s, was intercepted by 250 Squadron, supported by Royal Navy fighters, and lost seven Stukas and two 109s. “Fleets of bombers with close fighter escorts and covering sweeps passed over XIII Corps all day to bomb and drop leaflets on MT at El Adem, Gambut and in the coastal wadis north of the escarpment. Beaufighters destroyed 14 Stukas and two Me.109s on the ground at Tmimi, and two Stukas and one CR.42 in a wadi north of Capuzzo, and a further six Me.110s were destroyed in air combat.” One German report states that Luftwaffe activity was low in the first few days not only because of RAF air action but also because of a torrential storm on the 16th that flooded the German-Italian airfields: “Suddenly, high waves tore down the wadi and took everything along with them. Then tent camps in the wadis around Derna were flooded within a few minutes and several people drowned. This disaster caused by bad weather also damaged the airfields in the neighbourhood of Derna. The runway was partly flooded.” (Report by Gen. Froehlich.) The battle was still confused, with action around Tobruk as the garrison pressured its besiegers, and various combats and manoeuvres all along the front, with neither side totally sure of where the enemy main strength was located. Rommel’s two panzer divisions were now well-placed and en masse to play a decisive role, and 7th Armoured Division was soon being rolled up, forcing its commander to abandon any offensive moves and adopt an all-round defence, with both sides being exhausted as night fell.

  Nevertheless, Rommel’s forces were suffering fuel and ammunition supply issues and he ordered the Afrika Korps on the defensive until the supply situation was resolved. However, in the absence of determined Allied activity, and more clarity on enemy positions, he reversed this on the afternoon of 22nd and personally led 21st Panzer against Sidi Rezegh, where a major tank battle developed. The airfield was held by 7th Armoured Division Support Group and they were forced to retire south towards their parent formation; meanwhile, 22nd Armoured attempted a counter-stroke, only to be hit in the flank and to lose 45 out of 80 tanks before it too retired. The 15th Panzer were also causing chaos, having hit the rear eastern flank of 7th Armoured Division, destroying or disrupting a number of support units, as well as 35 tanks. So, on the evening of the 22nd, Rommel looked to be in a good position, his armour remained concentrated, had suffered few losses, and had destroyed almost 50% of 7th Armoured Division. “At nightfall the situation in rear of XIII Corps appeared confused with no news of XXX Corps except the report brought by General Cunningham on his visit at midday before his return to Battle HQ at Maddalena. Our bombers and fighters were turned on to attack the enemy as he approached the wire. Owing to lack of identification flags . . . a certain amount of indiscriminate strafing from the air took place. Since Rommel was using a large proportion of captured British vehicles mistakes in identification were excusable. Nearly all columns both enemy and friendly in the so-called Matruh Stakes were moving in an easterly direction and it was singularly difficult for anyone either on the ground or in the air to pick out whether any particular cloud of dust was friend or foe.” (Geddes.)

  On the 23rd the 7th Armoured Division was surrounded when 15th Panzer linked up with Ariete Division; it was a weak encirclement and after further fighting the day ended with the Axis forces seemingly in control. However, they were a stretched and spent force, with heavy losses and lack of supplies. Most regiments had few tanks left as runners. Although XXX Corps had been mauled it was still in existence, and XIII Corps had suffered far less and was still advancing, albeit slowly. Likewise, the sweep by the Indian Brigade had made progress and had reached Gialo, and the Tobruk garrison had also had some success in seizing strongpoints from the Italian besiegers. Rommel seemed confident that he had broken the main Allied thrusts, and whilst Cunningham had failed to destroy the Axis forces, his second aim of relieving Tobruk was by no means ended. Operation CRUSADER was not yet dead.

  Rommel’s plan was a “dash to the wire” with his two panzer Divisions and with no thought of protecting flanks but rather carving his way forward and disrupting the overall Allied strategy; in part this was predicated on his belief that British commanders were indecisive and unable to react to the fast-pace of an armoured battle – and they had yet to learn the concept of concentration of
armour. By the afternoon, German armour was at the Egyptian frontier, having caused chaos and confusion, but lack of supplies meant that no tanks accompanied the units that pressed on into Egypt. Whilst the Allies were confused, so were the Germans, as communications broke down and reliance was placed on recce patrols to try to maintain operational control between units. Rommel expected the British to pull back and this would enable him, from his flank position, to engage and destroy them as they moved back on Egypt. His orders for the 25th were for the destruction of British forces in the Sollum-Sidi Omar area, and to clear up the Sidi Rezegh battlefield area, with 21st Panzer positioned to intercept the retreat south of Halfaya. In the Sidi Omar area, British artillery and anti-tank guns proved effective in preventing 21st Panzer Division achieving its aim, albeit at heavy cost to the gunners. “The enemy in the defensive line opened a terrific fire. The regiment [5th Panzer] charged this line of guns and after hard fighting silenced two batteries and six anti-tank guns. More enemy batteries and anti-tank guns on the left flank of the regiment now entered the fight. The regiment then tried to bypass the enemy on the right . . . but brought up anti-tank and field guns . . . and extended his line. The regiment was now running short of ammunition and was forced to deploy to the right and move away south to break off the action. The regiment had been reduced to the strength of a reinforced company and had little petrol or ammunition.” (Operational Summary, 5th Panzer Regiment.)

  The 25th was also significant in that the encirclement of Tobruk was broken when the 2nd New Zealand Division made contact with the garrison. Rommel was unaware of this for some time, as his forward position was out of touch with Afrika Korps HQ for much of the time; he became aware when he realized that 21st Panzer was no longer where he expected it to be; it had been redirected by Afrika Korps HQ to strike the New Zealanders and restore the situation around Tobruk. Meanwhile, 8th Army’s losses in tanks were being made good by the supply depots and its strength was rapidly building up, albeit with less experienced crews. However, in the next few days of fighting, as Rommel gradually developed a better tactical feel for the battle, the 2nd New Zealand Division virtually ceased to exist, with over 2,500 men taken prisoner. The new battle around Tobruk and towards Sollum was poised to disrupt or destroy the British XXX Corps and, according to a German account, they were saved by “wellplanned flying mission by RAF units. The British flying units inflicted heavy losses on the Afrika Korps. Strong British flying units intervened during daylight hours almost without interval in the ground fighting. They controlled the Via Balbia all day, so that vehicles could use it only during darkness.” Even more critical was the Allied domination of the Mediterranean logistic routes, which ensured Rommel was continually short of supplies.